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ABSTRACT: This article is concerned with a controversy that
has been raging for over four years - the anti-harmful tax
competition initiative launched by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") in April
1998, and that organization's subsequent blacklisting of
several small defenseless jurisdictions who have dared to
use tax competitive measures to secure for themselves a
small piece of the global financial pie. On one side of the
controversy sits the OECD: rich, powerful, domineering,
and exhibiting many of the features of the colonial powers
of the late fifteenth through twentieth centuries. On the
other side sits the targeted jurisdictions: mostly island-
nations of the Pacific and Caribbean, with their fragile
economies and a constant struggle to survive in today's
globalized economy. This article focuses on the OECD and
on one group of targeted jurisdictions - the member states
of CARICOM. The article demonstrates how the OECD,
through its anti-harmful tax competition initiative, has
robbed these Caribbean countries of their sovereign right to
determine their tax and economic policies.
INTRODUCTION
In April 1998, the Paris-based OECD' launched an attack on
1. The OECD is a Paris-based organization with representatives from thirty of
the world's richest countries. The current members of the organization are:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg,
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. See OECD, OECD Member Countries, available at http://www.oecd.org (last
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what it deemed harmful tax competition. The attack came in the
form of a report identifying various features of preferential tax
regimes and tax havens. Two years later, on June 26, 2000, the
OECD published another report, Towards Global Tax Co-opera-
tion: Report to the 2000 Ministerial Council Meeting and Recom-
mendations by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs: Progress in
Identifying and Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices,' listing
thirty-five jurisdictions as meeting the tax haven criteria of the
1998 report and, as such, as being "potentially harmful" tax
regimes.4 The report called on the listed countries to provide the
OECD with commitments to reform their laws and fiscal policies
to eliminate those features which made the jurisdictions poten-
tially harmful tax regimes and/or tax havens.5 Six jurisdictions
signed advanced commitment letters prior to publication of the
report, and thereby avoided being listed thereon.'
Even before the OECD issued its 2000 Report, two of its ancil-
lary entities issued their own reports regarding related tax and
economic issues. In April 2000, the Financial Stability Forum
("FSF") issued their Report of the Working Group on Offshore Cen-
ters, a report that established three categories for offshore finan-
cial centers, and proceeded to categorize some of the world's
financial centers, placing them into one of the FSF's categories.'
visited June 19, 2002) [hereinafter "OECD Website"]. In 1998, the Slovak Republic
was not yet a member of the OECD.
2. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998),
[hereinafter "HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION"].
3. OECD (2000), available at http://www.oecd.orgtpdf/mOO0014000/m0O014130.
pdf.
4. Id. at 17. The thirty-five jurisdictions listed were: Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua
and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin
Islands, Cook Islands, Commonwealth of Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey/
Sark/Alderney, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liberia, Principality of Liechtenstein, Republic of
the Maldives, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Principality of Monaco, Montserrat,
Republic of Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Nieui, Panama, Samoa, Republic of the
Seychelles, St. Lucia, Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Tonga, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States Virgin Islands, and
Republic of Vanuatu.
5. OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION: REPORT TO THE 2000
MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETING AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMM. ON FISCAL
AFFAIRS: PROGRESS IN IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES 19
(2000), available at htt://www.oecd.org/pdf/mOO0014000/m00014130.pdf.
6. The six jurisdictions signing advanced commitment letters were: Bermuda,
Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius, and San Marino. Copies of the
commitment letters can be obtained at: http://www.oecd.org/EN/document/0,,EN-
document-0-nodirectorate-no-4-4393-0,00.htm Oast visited June 19, 2002).
7. REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON OFFSHORE FIN. CENTRES, FIN. STABILITY
FORUM (2000).
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Four days before the OECD issued its report, the Financial Action
Task Force ("FATF") published a report naming fifteen jurisdic-
tions that failed to take adequate measures to combat interna-
tional money laundering.' The FATF report deemed the fifteen
jurisdictions to be the least cooperative with international money
laundering investigators, and thereby offered the best protection
for those interested in keeping their assets secret.9
Most of the countries included on the OECD and FATF lists
are small Caribbean and Pacific island nations. When one
includes those jurisdictions that signed advanced commitments,
and thus avoided inclusion on the OECD blacklist, the OECD and
FATF blacklists targeted several members of the Caribbean Com-
munity and Common Market ("CARICOM"). 1° Ten of the black-
listed countries are full-fledged CARICOM members;" three are
associate members; 12 and four have observer status within CAR-
ICOM. 13 Not surprisingly, the CARICOM countries loudly pro-
tested their inclusion in the OECD and FATF lists. Yet, two years
later, when the OECD published its seven-member List of Uncoop-
erative Tax Havens, none of the listed countries were in any way
associated with the CARICOM community.
14
This article will examine the effects of the OECD (and to a
lesser extent, the FATF) blacklisting of the CARICOM countries
included on the 2000 list, particularly on their economies and on
their ability to determine their own taxation and economic poli-
8. FATF ON MONEY LAUNDERING, OECD, 1999-2000 ANNUAL REPORT ANNEX A
(2000). FATF has subsequently released this report as an independent report under
the same title. The 15 countries listed in the report as money laundering havens are:
the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Commonwealth of Dominica, Israel,
Lebanon, Principality of Liechtenstein, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Republic of
Nauru, Niue, Panama, Philippines, Russia, Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis, and St.
Vincent and the Grenadines.
9. Id.
10. See THE CARIBBEAN CMTY.-MEMBER COUNTRIES AND ASSOCIATED MEMBERS,
available at www.caricom.org/members.htm (last visited June 24, 2002).
11. Id. The full-fledged CARICOM members are: Antigua and Barbuda, the
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St.
Lucia, Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
12. Id. The associate members are: Anguilla, British Virgin Islands and Turks and
Caicos Islands.
13. Id. The jurisdictions with CARICOM Observer Status are: Aruba, Bermuda,
Cayman Islands, and Netherlands Antilles.
14. See OECD, Tax Haven Update (2002), available at www.oecd.org/EN/
document/0,EN-document-0-nodirectorate-no-4-4393-0,00.html (last visited June 19,
2002). The jurisdictions listed on the 2002 list are: Andorra, Principality of
Liechtenstein, Liberia, Principality of Monaco, Republic of the Marshall Islands,
Republic of Nauru, and Republic of Vanuatu.
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cies. The article will maintain that although the OECD's so-called
anti-harmful tax competition initiative has not given the organi-
zation the absolute victory it had hoped for, the mere blacklisting
of the CARICOM nations has had a tremendous negative effect on
their economies and on their ability to maintain their sovereignty.
Section I will identify the parties to the controversy - the
OECD on the one hand, and the CARICOM countries on the other.
This section will discuss the historical background of each of these
entities, and discuss their goals and aspirations. Section II will
discuss the OECD tax initiative. This section will trace the his-
tory of the initiative, from its launching in April 1998 to the
OECD's publication of the List of Uncooperative Tax Havens in
April 2002. Section III will discuss the CARICOM reaction to the
blacklisting. This section will show that Caribbean nationals -
from government officials to ordinary citizens - have widely criti-
cized the blacklisting and the OECD tax initiative. Section IV will
discuss the economic impact of the blacklisting on the CARICOM
nations. This section will demonstrate that in most CARICOM
nations - and particularly in Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica,
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines - the OECD blacklisting has
had significant detrimental effects on their economic outlook. Sec-
tion V will chronicle the battle for sovereignty waged by CAR-
ICOM in response to the OECD initiative. This section will
illustrate the OECD's intransigence in the matter, and will
demonstrate that but for the change of heart of the United States
following the advent of the Bush Administration, the CARICOM
nations would have been at the complete mercy of the OECD coun-
tries. The section will conclude, however, that notwithstanding
the revised U.S. position, CARICOM nations have had to effec-
tively surrender their sovereignty on tax and economic policy to
the OECD. Finally, the article will conclude with a restatement of
this article's thesis - that the OECD, like the pirates who plied
the waters of the Caribbean during the sixteenth through nine-
teenth centuries, has, through its ill-advised anti-harmful tax
competition initiative, effectively robbed fourteen CARICOM
nations of their sovereign right to determine their tax and eco-
nomic policies.
I. PARTIES TO THE CONTROVERSY
Although the OECD's anti-harmful tax competition initiative
targeted the island-nations of the Pacific Rim and the Caribbean,
along with several small principalities and developing nations,
2002]
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this article focuses on the OECD's interactions with one group of
targeted jurisdictions - the member states of CARICOM. This
section will give some background to the two parties.
A. The OECD
15
The OECD is the successor to the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation ("OEEC"). The OEEC was formed under
the Marshall Plan to administer North American aid for European
reconstruction following World War II. The organization's mem-
bers renamed it the OECD after the United States and Canada
became members in September 1961. The OECD's stated mission
is "to strengthen the economies of its member countries, improve
the efficiency of market systems, and contribute to free trade
expansion between both industrialized and developing nations."16
Although the OECD initially focused on its member countries
and their respective policies, the organization eventually turned
its attention to advising emerging market economies and analyz-
ing the impact of increasing interaction of various economic poli-
cies across the world.17  The OECD aims to increase its
membership and to eventually create a world economy that is
more prosperous and knowledge-based.18
In light of the OECD's mission, it is not surprising that inter-
national tax policy is among the issues it addresses. 9 In 1977, for
example, the OECD made a major contribution in the area of
international taxation with its Model Double Tax Convention,
which sought to alleviate the burdens of double taxation.20
Although not initially receiving widespread acceptance, the OECD
Model Double Tax Convention has by now served as a template for
15. Most of the material presented in this subsection is available on the OECD
Website. See generally OECD Website., supra note 1. Material obtained from other
sources will be identified through the use of footnotes. Footnotes will also be used as
necessary to clarify information available at OECD Website.
16. See id. (noting that the OECD acts as a facilitator and liaison for developing
global economy); see also Barbara Crytchfield George et al., The 1998 OECD
Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Toward Corruption in
Business Transactions, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 487-88 (2000); Alexander Townsend,
Jr., The Global Schoolyard Bully: The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development's Coercive Efforts to Control Tax Competition, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
215, 227-28 (2001).
17. See OECD Website, supra note 1.
18. See id.
19. Id. (confirming OECD's focus on international economic issues, including
international taxation).
20. See OECD, MODEL TAx CONVENTION (1977).
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several tax treaties.21 In addition to its contribution to interna-
tional taxation through the Model Double Tax Convention, the
OECD has also addressed a wide range of issues within that area,
and continues to analyze a variety of global taxation issues.22
Each year, the OECD publishes statistics on tax revenues gener-
ated in OECD member countries. 23 The OECD is also involved in
proposing recommendations for fighting corruption, carrying out
e-commerce and implementing transfer-pricing policies.24 Over
the past few years, the OECD has shifted its focus to alleged
harmful tax practices facilitated by globalization.25
From the OECD's viewpoint, "globalization and new elec-
tronic technologies can enable a proliferation of tax regimes
designed to attract geographically mobile activities. 12 6 Accord-
ingly, the organization maintains, governments need to take mea-
sures to protect their tax bases.27 In particular, says the OECD,
governments "need to intensify their international cooperation to
avoid the world-wide reduction in welfare caused by tax-induced
distortions in capital and financial flows. "28
As regards a definition, the OECD believes that harmful tax
practices may exist when certain jurisdictions tailor their tax
regimes to erode the tax bases of other countries.2 1 "This [erosion]
can occur when tax regimes attract investment or savings
originating elsewhere and when they facilitate the avoidance of
other countries' taxes." ° Apparently, the OECD - whose mem-
bers boast free-market economies - does not believe in free enter-
prise and open-market competition in the area of taxation.
Because many CARICOM member states had, by 1998, begun
21. See PHILIP BAKER, DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS AND INT'L TAX LAw 4 (2"
d
ed. 1994) (OECD Model was basis for negotiating double taxation agreements); see
also Robert Thornton Smith, Tax Treaty Interpretation by the Judiciary, 49 TAX
LAW. 845, 845 (1996) (OECD Model has served as principal basis for treaty
negotiations among developed nations); Townsend, supra note 16, at 227 (OECD
Model Double Tax Convention of 1977 served as template for subsequent treaties).
22. See OECD Website, supra note 1 (noting various fiscal areas addressed by
OECD, including transfer pricing, corruption, and statistical analysis).
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. See id. (contending that globalization proliferates the spread of harmful tax
competition that requires cooperative redress).
26. See Peter Yu, The OECD and Harmful Tax Competition, H.K. LAw., May 2001,
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to utilize tax competitive measures to attract much-needed foreign
investment, the OECD's shift in focus to the effects of globaliza-
tion put it on a collision course with these Caribbean nations.
B. CARICOM31
The Caribbean island chain lies in the aptly-named Carib-
bean Sea, the body of water separating North and South America.
Belize, a Central American country, and Guyana, in South
America, are typically considered part of the Caribbean. "Discov-
ered" by Christopher Columbus on his journeys to the New World
in the late fifteenth to early sixteenth centuries, the Caribbean
nations were at various times colonies of Great Britain, France,
the Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, and the United States." Dur-
ing the 1950s, the British colonies in the Caribbean began a move
toward unifying the various islands under one government. This
movement culminated in the formation of the British West Indies
Federation in 1958. The Federation was a Federal Government
drawn from ten member states of what was then known as the
British West Indies.3 ' The Federation was short-lived, folding in
1962 after Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica suddenly withdrew
from the group. 5
Over the next eleven years, Caribbean leaders held several
discussions aimed at reviving - in some way - the defunct Brit-
ish West Indies Federation. At the same time, many of the coun-
tries were obtaining political independence from Britain. The
efforts of these leaders came to fruition on July 4, 1973, with the
signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas, which established the Car-
ibbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM). The treaty
was signed by Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad and
Tobago. Eight other Caribbean territories - Antigua, British
Honduras (now Belize), Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia,
31. Most of the materials in this subsection are available at the CARICOM
Website, http://www.caricom.org (last visited July 30, 2002) [hereinafter "CARICOM
Website"]. Material obtained from other sources will be identified through the use of
footnotes. Footnotes will also be used as necessary to clarify information available at
CARICOM Website.
32. See generally F.R. AUGIER ET.AL., THE MAKING OF THE WEST INDIES (7 th ed.
1967).
33. CARICOM Website, supra note 31 (discussing history of CARICOM).
34. Id. The ten members were: Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica,
Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago; e-mail
from Edward A. Alexander, Information and Communications Advisor, CARICOM
Representation in Haiti (Aug. 23, 2002, 09:13 CDT) (on file with author).
35. CARICOM Website, supra note 31.
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Montserrat, St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla, and St. Vincent - became
full members on May 1, 1974.16 Subsequently, the Bahamas, Haiti
and Suriname also became members of CARICOM.37 Several
other Latin American and Caribbean territories enjoy Observer
Status in various institutions of the Community and CARICOM
Ministerial bodies. These territories are: Aruba, Bermuda, Cay-
man Islands, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Netherlands
Antilles, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela. Three others, all British col-
onies - Anguilla, British Virgin Islands and Turks and Caicos
Islands - are CARICOM associate members.38
From its inception, CARICOM "has concentrated on the pro-
motion of the integration of the economies of member states, coor-
dinating the foreign policies of the independent member states,
and in functional cooperation, especially in relation to various
areas of social and human endeavor."39 Some of the principal
issues currently on CARICOM's agenda include: restructuring of
regional organs and institutions; analysis of the impact of NAFTA
on existing arrangements, such as the Caribbean-Canada Trade
Agreement ("CARIBCAN") and the Caribbean Basin Initiative
("CBI"); resolution of the Haitian crisis; strengthening of relations
with the wider Caribbean through the establishment of trade and
economic agreements with Venezuela, Colombia, and the wider
Caribbean; and deepening the integration process in the Carib-
bean Community through the formation of a single market and
economy.
During the period that they were colonies of the European
industrialized nations, CARICOM members produced various
agricultural products - sugar, coffee, bananas and citrus, among
others.4 ° After obtaining independence from their colonial mas-
ters, many Caribbean countries turned to tourism as a means of
developing their economies.4 ' Many of the island nations also
developed financial services industries, often to help diversify
their economies and to mitigate the harmful effects of the annual
36. Id.
37. Id. (discussing CARICOM members and their status). The Bahamas is a
member of the Caribbean Community, but not the Common Market. Haiti became a
full-fledged member of CARICOM on July 4, 2002.
38. Id. Anguilla was once a part of the state of St. KittsNevis/Anguitla. That
state has been broken up into two entities, the Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis, an
independent twin-island nation, and Anguilla, a British colony.
39. Id. (discussing history of CARICOM).
40. See generally LENNOX HONYCHURCH, THE DOMINICA STORY 53-59, 157-63
(1984) (discussing island plantation life both during and after slavery).
41. Id.
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hurricanes that played "utter havoc" with their tourism plants.42
At the core of these financial services provided by the CARICOM
member states lies the off-shore banking sector. Fostered by tax
regimes with no or only nominal rates, and strict secrecy rules,
the off-shore banking sector flourished in the Caribbean.43 For
example, in terms of the size of its capital market, the Cayman
Islands (a CARICOM Observer) is the fifth largest in the world,
behind New York, London, Tokyo, and Hong Kong." Also, from
1985 to 1994, the value of investments put into the low tax juris-
dictions of the Caribbean and South Pacific islands grew tenfold,
to over $200 billion.45 Indeed, some commentators put the figure
in the trillions.4" Still, commentators sympathetic to the Carib-
bean cause maintain that together with tourism, the off-shore
banking sector helps to generate a measure of self-sufficiency for
the islands, helping them put the necessary mechanisms in place
to declare their full economic freedom.
47
Just as the CARICOM countries appeared to be on the verge
of developing a truly prosperous financial services industry, the
OECD struck, launching its anti-harmful tax competition initia-
tive. The next section of this article will discuss the substance of
the OECD tax initiative.
II. THE OECD TAX INITIATIVE
A. The 1998 Report
On April 9, 1998, the OECD approved a report entitled Harm-
ful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (hereinafter
"Harmful Tax Competition")." The report was the result of an
OECD-initiated study to determine the extent of global tax compe-
tition.49 In preparing this report, the OECD's Committee on Fiscal
42. Everson W. Hull, The OECD Imperialists: Implications for the Island of Nevis,
remarks presented to legislators and staff at the Capitol Hill Club, Washington, DC
(September 29, 2000) available at www.bahamasb2b.com/b2b/big-picture/articles/
drhull.htm (last visited May 30, 2002).




46. James Canute, Islands Hail Success of Efforts on Money Laundering, FIN.
TIMES, July 5, 2001, at 7.
47. Hull, supra note 42.
48. See generally OECD, HARMFUL TAx COMPETITION, supra note 2.
49. Id. at 8 (stating that harmful tax competition dislocates financial and service
activities, erodes national tax bases of other countries, distorts trade and investment
patterns, and diminishes fairness and social acceptance of tax systems); see also
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Affairs, turning its attention specifically to geographically mobile
activities," examined provisions in various tax systems across the
world."' In essence, Harmful Tax Competition (1) created the
Forum on Harmful Tax Practices, (2) established guidelines for
dealing with alleged harmful preferential tax regimes in OECD
member countries, and (3) adopted a series of recommendations to
combat harmful tax practices of non-OECD countries.2
In establishing its guidelines and recommendations, Harmful
Tax Competition paid significant attention to the phenomenon of
globalization. In that respect, the report first examined the bene-
fits of globalization - facilitating tax system reform that focuses
on base-broadening and rate reductions; encouraging reassess-
ment of domestic tax systems to reduce governmental spending
and induce investment; and improving global welfare and stan-
dards of living due to a more efficient allocation and utilization of
resources.
53
Next, the report emphasized the negative impact of globaliza-
tion and its impact on tax competition, including the increased
ability of individuals to move capital from high tax jurisdictions to
lower tax jurisdictions.54 The report listed the harms caused by
this capital movement as: (1) distorting financial and, indirectly,
real investment flows; (2) undermining the integrity and fairness
of tax structures; (3) discouraging compliance by all taxpayers; (4)
reshaping the desired level and mix of taxes and public spending;
(5) causing undesired shifts in part of the tax burden to less
mobile tax bases, such as labor, property and consumption; and (6)
increasing the administrative costs and comlliance burdens on
tax authorities and taxpayers.55
Of significance to the CARICOM countries, Harmful Tax
Competition identified two types of harmful tax practices: harmful
Edmund W. Granski, Jr., International Wealth Management Initiatives, 225 N.Y.L.J.
9, (2001) (OECD seeks to develop measures to counter effects harmful tax
competition has on national tax bases of its member countries).
50. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION , supra note 2, at 8 (stating that the
1998 Report focuses on financial and service activities).
51. See id. (Harmful Tax Competition examines general income tax provisions and
specific taxes levied on certain types of income).
52. Id.
53. See id. at 13-14.
54. See id. at 16 (identifying effects of capital dislocation).
55. Id.; see also David E. Spencer, Stepping Up The Pressure on Tax Havens: An
Update, 12 J. INT'L TAXATION 26, 36 (2001) (noting the OECD 1998 Report's emphasis
on globalization and technology contributing to tax competition).
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preferential tax regimes and tax havens.6 The report then went
on to discuss "harmful tax practices." Essentially, according to the
OECD, harmful tax practices exist when tax regimes are tailored
to erode the tax bases of other countries.57 This can occur when
tax regimes attract investment or savings originating elsewhere,
and when they facilitate the avoidance of other countries' taxes.
58
The report distinguished the two types of practices. Although
some criteria for identifying both practices are similar, specific
provisions vary enough to allow a jurisdiction to be classified as
either a tax haven or a harmful preferential tax regime.59
Harmful Tax Competition identified the following as key fac-
tors in characterizing and assessing harmful preferential tax
regimes: (1) the regime imposes low or no taxes on relevant
income (from geographically mobile financial and other service
activities); (2) the regime is ring-fenced from the domestic econ-
omy - i.e., the low tax rates offered by the regime are fully or
partially insulated from the domestic economy and are applicable
only to non-residents; (3) the regime lacks transparency - i.e., the
details of the regime or its application are not apparent, or inade-
quate regulatory supervision or financial disclosure exists; and (4)
no effective exchange of information with outside authorities or
entities exists with respect to the regime. ° Harmful Tax Competi-
tion listed additional criteria to be analyzed upon confirmation of
the four previous criteria. These additional analytical factors
included: (1) the regime has an artificial definition of the tax base;
(2) the regime's failure to adhere to international transfer-pricing
principles; (3) foreign source income is exempt from tax within the
regime; (4) the regime offers a negotiable tax rate or tax base; (5)
the existence of secrecy provisions within the regime; (6) the
regime is promoted as a tax minimization vehicle; and (7) the
regime encourages purely tax driven operations or arrange-
ments. 1 Notwithstanding the criteria it enumerated for harmful
preferential tax regimes, the report failed to propose a specific tax
rate that would indicate that a particular regime qualified as a
56. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 2, at 8.
57. See generally Yu, supra note 26.
58. Id.
59. See OECD, HARMFUL TAx COMPETITION, supra note 2, at 22-34 (noting that
harmful preferential tax regimes can have provisions in tax legislation that give
preferential treatment to specific classes of taxpayers, while tax havens primarily
offer no, or very low, taxes to all types of income).
60. See generally Yu, supra note 26.
61. OECD, HARMFUL TAx COMPETITION, supra note 2, at 30-34.
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harmful preferential tax regime.62
According to the OECD, in general terms, tax havens are
jurisdictions that fail to generate significant tax revenue due to
nominal or no tax rates." Harmful Tax Competition identified the
following factors in characterizing a country as a tax haven: (1)
the jurisdiction imposes no or nominal taxes on the relevant
income from geographically mobile, financial and other service
activities; (2) the jurisdiction lacks a policy of effective exchange of
information regarding its financial service providers, thereby
ensuring bank and banking secrecy; (3) the jurisdiction's financial
service regimes lack transparency - i.e., the jurisdiction does not
impose adequate regulatory supervision on the regimes or require
adequate financial disclosure; and (4) the jurisdiction facilitates
the establishment of foreign-owned entities without the need for a
local substantive presence, or prohibits those entities from having
any commercial impact on the local economy. 4 According to the
OECD Report, tax havens are essentially jurisdictions that allow
non-resident taxpayers to hold passive investments, book-paper
profits, and hide their affairs from discovery by their resident tax-
ing authorities. 5 The report did not, however, state the tax rate
that would be considered nominal and characteristic of a tax
haven.66
Having identified the characteristics of the two so-called det-
rimental tax practices, Harmful Tax Competition boldly asserted
that governments needed to proactively counter the impact and
spread of these practices - that is, tax havens and harmful pref-
erential tax regimes. 67 To that end, the report listed nineteen rec-
ommendations ("Recommendations") countries could adopt to
counteract the negative impacts of the tax systems of jurisdictions
where these practices are found.6" The Recommendations focused
62. See id. at 25-35. The report fails to enumerate a tax range indicative of
harmful preferential tax regimes.
63. See id. at 21 (stating that tax havens do not generate significant revenue from
tax systems and also have reduced regulatory and administrative constraints).
64. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 2, at 22-23.
65. See Townsend, supra note 16, at 239.
66. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 2, at 22-25. As with its
discussion of harmful preferential tax regimes, the report does not enumerate the tax
rate or range of tax rates indicative of tax havens; see also George M. Melo, Taxation
in the Global Arena: Preventing the Erosion of National Tax Bases or Impinging on
Territorial Sovereignty?, 12 PACE INT'L L. REV. 183, 197 (2000) (commenting on failure
of OECD to propose a tax rate considered to be harmful).
67. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 2, at 37.
68. See id. at 67-71. The nineteen Recommendations were as follows:
I. Recommendations concerning domestic legislation and practices
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1. Recommendation concerning Controlled Foreign Corporations (CFC) or
equivalent rules: that countries that do not have such rules consider adopting them
and that countries that have such rules ensure that they apply in a fashion consistent
with the desirability of curbing harmful tax practices.
2. Recommendation concerning foreign investment fund or equivalent rules:
that countries that do not have such rules consider adopting them and that countries
that have such rules consider applying them to income and entities covered by
practices considered to constitute harmful tax competition.
3. Recommendation concerning restrictions on participation exemption and
other systems of exempting foreign income in the context of harmful tax competition:
that countries that apply the exemption method to eliminate double taxation of
foreign source income consider adopting rules that would ensure that foreign income
that has benefited from tax practices deemed as constituting harmful tax competition
do not qualify for the application of the exemption method.
4. Recommendation concerning foreign information reporting rules: that
countries that do not have rules concerning reporting of international transactions
and foreign operations of resident taxpayers consider adopting such rules and that
countries exchange information obtained under these rules.
5. Recommendation concerning rulings: that countries, where administrative
decisions concerning the particular position of a taxpayer may be obtained in advance
of planned transactions, make public the conditions for granting, denying or revoking
such decisions.
6. Recommendation concerning transfer pricing rules: that countries follow
principles set out in the OECD's 1995 Guideline on Transfer Pricing and thereby
refrain from applying or not applying their transfer pricing rules in a way that would
constitute harmful tax competition.
7. Recommendation concerning access to banking information for tax
purposes: in the context of counteracting harmful tax competition, countries should
review their laws, regulations and practices which govern access to banking
information with a view to removing impediments to the access to such information
by tax authorities.
II. Recommendation concerning tax treaties
8. Recommendation concerning greater and more efficient use of exchanges of
information: that countries should undertake programs to intensify exchange of
relevant information concerning transactions in tax havens and preferential tax
regimes constituting harmful tax competition.
9. Recommendation concerning the entitlement to treaty benefits: that
countries consider including in their tax conventions provisions aimed at restricting
the entitlement to treaty benefits for entities and income covered by measures
constituting harmful tax practices and consider how the existing provisions of their
tax conventions can be applied for the same purpose; that the Model Tax Convention
be modified to include such provisions or clarifications as are needed in that respect.
10. Recommendation concerning the clarification of domestic anti-abuse rules
and doctrines in tax treaties: that the Commentary on the Model Tax Convention be
clarified to remove any uncertainty or ambiguity regarding the compatibility of
domestic anti-abuse measures with the Model Tax Convention.
11. Recommendation concerning a list of specific exclusion provisions found in
treaties: that the Committee prepare and maintain a list of provisions used by
countries to exclude from the benefits of tax conventions certain specific entities or
types of income and that the list be used by Member countries as a reference point
when negotiating tax conventions as a basis for discussions in the Forum.
12. Recommendation concerning tax treaties with tax havens: that countries
consider terminating their tax conventions with tax havens and consider not entering
into tax treaties with such countries in the future.
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13. Recommendation concerning coordinated enforcement regimes (joint
audits; coordinated training programs, etc.): that countries consider undertaking
coordinated enforcement programs (such as simultaneous examinations, specific
exchange of information projects or joint training activities) in relation to income or
taxpayers benefiting from practices constituting harmful tax competition.
14. Recommendation concerning assistance in recovery of tax claims: that
countries be encouraged to review the current rules applying to the enforcement of
tax claims of other countries and that the Committee pursue its work in this area
with a view to drafting provisions that could be included in tax conventions for that
purpose.
III. Recommendations to intensify international co-operation in response to
harmful tax competition.
15. Recommendation for Guidelines and a Forum on Harmful Tax Practices:
that the Member countries endorse the Guidelines on harmful preferential tax
regimes set out [below] and establish a Forum to implement the Guidelines and other
Recommendations in this Report.
Recommendation 15 Guidelines For Dealing With Harmful Preferential Tax
Regimes in Member Countries:
i. To refrain from adopting new measures, or extending the scope of, or
strengthening existing measures, in the form of legislative provisions or
administrative practices related to taxation, that constitute harmful tax practices as
defined in Section III of Chapter 2 of the Report.
ii. To review their existing measures for the purpose of identifying those
measures, in the form of legislative provisions or administrative practices related to
taxation, that constitute harmful tax practices as defined in Section III of Chapter 2
of the Report. These measures will be reported in the Forum on Harmful Tax
Practices and will be included in a list within 2 years from the date on which these
Guidelines are approved by the OECD Council.
iii. To remove, before the end of 5 years from the date on which the
Guidelines are approved by the OECD Council, the harmful features of their
preferential tax regimes identified in the list referred to in paragraph 2. However, in
respect of taxpayers who are benefiting from such regimes on 31 December 2000, the
benefits that they derive will be removed at the latest on the 31 December 2005. This
will ensure that such particular tax benefits have been entirely removed after that
date. The list referred to in paragraph 2 will be reviewed annually to delete those
regimes that no longer constitute harmful preferential tax regimes.
iv. Each member country which believes that an existing measure not
already included in the list referred to in paragraph 2, or a proposed or new measure
of itself or of another country, constitutes a measure, in the form of legislative
provision or administrative practice related to taxation, that might constitute a
harmful tax practice in light of the factors identified in Section III of Chapter 2 of the
Report, may request that the measure be examined by the Member countries, through
the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices, for purposes of the application of paragraph 1
or for inclusion in the list referred to in paragraph 2. The Forum may issue a non-
binding opinion on that question.
v. To coordinate, through the Forum, their national and treaty responses to
harmful tax practices adopted by other countries.
vi. To use the Forum to encourage actively non-member countries to
associate themselves with the Guidelines.
16. Recommendation to produce a list of tax havens: that the Forum be
mandated to establish, within one year of the first meeting of the Forum, a list of tax
havens on the basis of factors identified in section II of Chapter 2.
17. Recommendation concerning links with tax havens: that countries that
have political, economic or other links with tax havens ensure that these links do not
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on encouraging and providing guidance to so-called harmful tax
jurisdictions to enact, or reform, their tax legislation and prac-
tices 9.6  The Recommendations also encouraged harmful jurisdic-
tions to alter treaty arrangements with OECD members."
Finally, the Recommendations encouraged OECD countries to ter-
minate then-existing treaties with tax havens, or those countries
with dependencies that were tax havens, and not to enter into
treaties with such countries until the harmful features were
removed.71
Harmful Tax Competition's final significant act was to estab-
lish a Forum on Harmful Tax Practices ("Forum").72 The Forum
was established to implement the Recommendations and to con-
sult with jurisdictions with harmful preferential tax regimes seek-
ing to reform their respective tax systems.7 3 The report mandated
the Forum establish a list of tax havens and countries with harm-
ful preferential tax regimes." The report also instructed the
Forum to engage in a dialogue with cooperative non-member
countries to promote the Harmful Tax Competition Recommenda-
tions.75 At the same time, the report established a deadline
whereby jurisdictions identified as having harmful tax practices
would comply with the Recommendations and thus eliminate
contribute to harmful tax competition and, in particular, that countries have
dependencies that are tax havens ensure that the links that they have with these tax
havens are not used in a way that increase [sic] or promote [sic] harmful tax
competition.
18. Recommendation to develop and actively promote Principles of Good Tax
Administration: that the Committee be responsible for developing and actively
promoting a set of principles that should guide tax administrations in the
enforcement of the Recommendations included in this report.
19. Recommendation on associating non-member countries with the
Recommendation: that the new Forum engage in a dialogue with non-member
countries using, where appropriate, the fora offered by other international tax
organizations, with the aim of promoting the Recommendations set out in this
Chapter, including the Guidelines. Id.
69. See id. at 39.
70. See id. at 39, 46 (stating that some Recommendations were to ensure that tax
treaties did not promote effects of harmful tax competition).
71. See id. at 50.
72. See id. at 54 (stating that the Forum is a subsidiary body, created to focus on
remedial work against harmful tax competition).
73. See id. at 54 (stating that the Forum is responsible for overseeing
implementation of Recommendations of Harmful Tax Competition and engaging in
dialogue with non-member countries).
74. See id. at 54-55.
75. See id. (noting that the Forum is an avenue for discussing harmful preferential
tax regimes, which will assist harmful tax competitive jurisdictions meet
Recommendations of Harmful Tax Competition).
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their harmful tax regimes.76 Accordingly, Harmful Tax Competi-
tion suggested that harmful preferential tax regimes remove their
respective harmful features by April 2003.17 A special "grandfa-
ther provision" allowed for regimes with features benefiting tax-
payers on December 31, 2000, to have these features removed by
December 31, 2005." Additionally, a "standstill provision" pre-
cluded a country from adopting new features or broadening
existing features.79
B. The 2000 Report
Having received its mandate from the OECD, the Forum set
to work. On June 26, 2000, the Forum presented the OECD Min-
isters with a progress report ("2000 Report") on the implementa-
tion of the Recommendations.8 ° As relevant here, the 2000 Report
identified jurisdictions that met the criteria for being tax havens."'
The 2000 Report also listed various defensive measures that
OECD member countries could adopt against uncooperative
jurisdictions.s2





80. OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION: REPORT TO THE 2000
MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETING AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMM. ON FISCAL
AFFAIRS IN IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES, supra note 5
[hereinafter "2000 Report"].
81. See id. at 16-17.
82. Id. at 25. The proposed defensive measures listed in the 2000 Report are:
(a) To disallow deductions, exemptions, credits, or other allowances
related to transactions with Uncooperative Tax Havens or to
transactions taking advantage of their harmful tax practices.
(b) To require comprehensive information reporting rules for
transactions involving Uncooperative Tax Havens or taking
advantage of their harmful tax practices, supported by substantial
penalties for inaccurate reporting or non-reporting of such
transactions.
(c) For countries that do not have Controlled Foreign Corporation
(CFC) or equivalent rules, to consider adopting such rules, and for
countries that have such rules, to ensure that they apply in a
fashion consistent with the desirability of curbing harmful tax
practices.
(d) To deny any exceptions (e.g. reasonable cause) that may
otherwise apply to the application of regular penalties in the case of
transactions involving entities organised in Uncooperative Tax
Havens or taking advantage of their harmful tax practices.
(e) To deny the availability of the foreign tax credit or the
participation exemption with regard to distributions that are
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the key role in the efforts to eliminate harmful tax competition."
The report - citing the global nature of harmful tax competition
- encouraged non-OECD members to familiarize themselves with
the contents of Harmful Tax Competition (the 1998 Report) and to
adopt its features.1' The new report also announced the OECD's
Committee on Fiscal Affairs' plans to conduct regional seminars to
assist with the removal of harmful features in the tax systems of
non-member jurisdictions."
The 2000 Report stated that thirty-five jurisdictions had met
the criteria for tax havens described in Harmful Tax Competition,
and should therefore be included on the List of Tax Havens.86 The
report requested that those jurisdictions make adjustments to
their respective fiscal policies to conform to the Recommendations
of Harmful Tax Competition. The report warned that any tax
haven jurisdiction that failed to comply would be deemed uncoop-
erative and could be subject to defensive measures by the OECD
member countries. 8 Still, the OECD maintained that the list was
sourced from Uncooperative Tax Havens or to transactions taking
advantage of their harmful tax practices.
(M) To impose withholding taxes on certain payments to residents of
Uncooperative Tax Havens.
(g) To enhance audit and enforcement activities with respect to
Uncooperative Tax Havens and transactions taking advantage of
their harmful tax practices.
(h) To ensure that any existing and new domestic defensive
measures against harmful tax practices are also applicable to
transactions with Uncooperative Tax Havens and to transactions
taking advantage of their harmful tax practices.
(i) Not to enter into any comprehensive income tax conventions
with Uncooperative Tax Havens, and to consider terminating any
such existing conventions unless certain conditions are met.
() To deny deductions and cost recovery, to the extent otherwise
allowable, for fees and expenses incurred in establishing or
acquiring entities incorporated in Uncooperative Tax Havens.
(k) To impose 'transactional' charges or levies on certain
transactions involving Uncooperative Tax Havens.
83. See id. at 22 (stating that non-member countries need to be included in effort
against harmful tax competition because they are either affected by or have harmful
tax practices).
84. See id. (stating that OECD working with non-member economies would
facilitate removal of harmful tax practices).
85. See id.
86. See id. at 17 (listing tax havens). Six jurisdictions signed advance
commitment letters to the OECD prior to publication of the list, thereby avoided being
included in the list.
87. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 2, at 67-71 (requesting,
among other things, that tax havens adopt CFC rules, foreign investment fund rules,
and exchange of information policies).
88. See OECD, 2000 Report, supra note 5, at 18-19.
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only "intended to reflect the technical conclusions of the [Commit-
tee on Fiscal Affairs] only and [was] not intended to be used as the
basis of possible co-ordinated defensive measures."89
That claim notwithstanding, the 2000 Report held stern
warnings for those jurisdictions included on the List of Tax
Havens. Jurisdictions on the preliminary list could remove them-
selves therefrom only by agreeing to "co-operate" with the OECD
initiative by signing either advance commitment letters (i.e., pre-
June 2000) or making scheduled commitments (post June 2000)
agreeing to institute policies reforming their tax policies in a man-
ner satisfactory to the OECD.90 Those jurisdictions that failed to
make such commitments would be included in the OECD List of
Uncooperative Tax Havens, originally scheduled for completion by
July 31, 2001.91 Jurisdictions that appeared on that list would be
subject to the coordinated defensive measures of the OECD mem-
ber countries.92
But even for those jurisdictions that submitted the required
commitments to the OECD, the quest to stay off the blacklist
would not automatically be over. The 2000 Report announced
that the Forum would conduct annual reviews of those jurisdic-
tions giving commitments to determine whether the established
milestones and timetables were being met.93 If any jurisdiction
failed to meet the milestones and timetables and any evidence
existed that the jurisdiction's commitment to the effort to elimi-
nate harmful tax competition was no longer in good faith, the
OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs would place the jurisdiction on
the List of Uncooperative Tax Havens.94
C. Other OECD Lists of 2000
Even before the Committee on Fiscal Affairs issued the 2000
Report, two other OECD ancillaries issued their own lists.
Although these lists are not the subject of this paper, their mere
existence has caused significant reaction among the general popu-
lation of the CARICOM countries. Accordingly, they merit some
discussion here.
89. Id. at 17.
90. See id. at 18; see also Debra B. Treyez and Anthony E. Woods, Recent
Developments in Int'l Anti-Money Laundering and Tax Harmonization Initiatives, 18
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 443, 449 (2001).
91. Id.
92. See OECD, 2000 Report, supra note 5, at 18.
93. See id.; see also OECD, Tax Haven Update, supra note 14.
94. Id.
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1. The FSF List
The first of the OECD "other lists" was issued by the FSF.9
The FSF was itself established at the February 1999 G-7 summit.
Its membership consists of both specific jurisdictions and various
non-governmental organizations. 6 Its main mandate is to pro-
mote financial stability through information exchange and inter-
national cooperation in financial supervision and surveillance.97
At its inaugural meeting on April 14, 1999, the FSF estab-
lished an ad hoc group, the Working Group on Offshore Financial
Centers. The ad hoc group submitted its first and only report to
the FSF on March 25-26, 2000. The FSF subsequently issued its
own report on April 5, 2000. This report identified five key pru-
dential and market integrity concerns in relation to Offshore
Financial Centers ("OFCs").99 The report also identified thirty-
seven OFCs - labeled as "Financial Centres with Significant Off-
shore Activities" - to which the FSF sent a survey to be com-
pleted in order to begin a process of assessment that it wanted the
IMF to eventually undertake. 100
95. REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON OFFSHORE FIN. CENTRES, FIN. STABILITY
FORUM, supra note 7.
96. See id. The FSF consists of forty members: three participants from each of the
G-7 countries; two participants each, from the IMF, World Bank, International
Organization of Securities Commissioners, the Basle Committee, and the
International Association of Insurance Supervisors; and one participant each, from
the Committee on Global Financial Systems, the Committee on Payment and
Settlement Systems, the Bank for International Settlement, the OECD, Australia,
Hong Kong, the Netherlands, and Singapore.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2. The five concerns listed were:
(a) Cross-border cooperation on information exchange, timely access to
information and ability to verify.
(b) Underlying supervision in an Offshore Financial Center.
(c) Lack of due diligence in financial institutions.
(d) Availability of information about beneficial ownership.
(e) Lack of comprehensive and timely data on Offshore Financial Centers'
financial activity.
100. Id. at Table I. Although the report claimed to identify thirty-seven
jurisdictions as "Financial Sectors with Significant Offshore Activities," it lists only
thirty-six such jurisdictions. The report lists the island of Nevis as a separate
jurisdiction from the island of St. Kitts; however, Nevis and St. Kitts are actually
united as one jurisdiction, the Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis. The thirty-seven
jurisdictions listed are: Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the
Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands,
Nauru, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Lebanon, Liechtenstein,
Macao, Malta, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Monaco, Netherlands Antilles, Nevis,
Niue, Panama, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa,
Seychelles, Turks and Caicos Islands, Vanuatu and Costa Rica. Of these
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Based on the survey results, the FSF issued a release that
established three categories for OFCs and categorized the various
jurisdictions accordingly. 1 ' Category I consisted of territories
whose "legal infrastructures and supervisory practices, and/or
level of resources devoted to supervision and co-operation" as well
as their "level of co-operation" were "largely of a good quality and
better than in other OFCs." °2 Category II consisted of territories
whose characteristics (as described for Category I territories) were
"largely of a higher quality than Group III, but lower than Group
I."' ° Category III consisted of territories whose characteristics
were "largely of a lower quality than in Group II."' °
In summary, the FSF report anticipated the IMF undergoing
a thorough assessment that would ultimately lead to reform in the
offshore financial services industry."5 However, unlike the OECD
2000 Report (and the FATF Report discussed infra), the FSF
Report and press release did not threaten sanctions or put direct
pressure on OFCs to engage in bilateral negotiations that would
remove them from less desirable positions on the list.0 6 Of signifi-
cance to the CARICOM countries, of the thirty-seven jurisdictions
deemed to have "significant offshore activities," fourteen are
either full or associate members of the organization, or had
observer status therein.0 7 Of these, the FSF placed twelve in Cat-
jurisdictions, Antigua and Barbuda, Cook Islands, Nauru, Lebanon, Republic of the
Marshall Islands, Nevis, Niue, St. Kitts, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Seychelles,
Turks and Caicos Islands and Costa Rica did not respond to the survey. However, in
the case of Antigua, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, which
are members of a currency board, a response was received by the FSF from the
monetary authority responsible for the domestic banking system in those
jurisdictions.. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION supra note 2, at Table 1.
101. Press Release, Financial Stability Forum, Financial Stability Forum Releases
Grouping of Offshore Financial Center (OFC's) to Assist in Setting Priorities for




105. See Treyez and Woods, supra note 90, at 464.
106. See id.
107. See Press Release, Fin. Stability Forum, supra note 101. The jurisdictions
with CARICOM member, associate member or observer status are: Anguilla, Antigua,
Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman
Islands, Netherlands Antilles, Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, and Turks and Caicos Islands.
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egory III,08 two in Category II,1°9 and none in Category I.
2. The FATF Report
The second OECD "other list" was contained in the FATF's
1999-2000 Annual Report, released in Paris, France, on June 22,
2000.110 The list identified jurisdictions that, in the FATF's opin-
ion, did not have adequate safeguards against money laundering.
The FATF was formed as a result of the G-7 1989 summit.
Members consist of representatives from twenty-nine countries
and two regional bodies."' In 1990, the FATF issued forty recom-
mendations that currently serve as a guide to international finan-
cial regulation.12 In 1998, in an effort to arrest money laundering,
the organization formed the Ad-hoc Group on Non-Cooperative
Jurisdictions."3 Two years later, in February 2000, the group
published a list of twenty-five criteria to determine whether a
jurisdiction had adequate safeguards against money laundering.1 4
The FATF divided the criteria into four broad categories:
(1) Loopholes in financial regulations, including:
(i) Inadequate regulations and supervision of financial
institutions;
(ii) Inadequate licensing rules, including background checks
on financial managers;
(iii) Inadequate "Know Your Customer" rules;
(iv) Excessive secrecy provisions;
(v) Lack of SAR systems.
(2) Obstacles raised by other regulatory requirements, including:
108. See id. The Category III CARICOM-affiliated territories were: Anguilla,
Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Cayman
Islands, Netherlands Antilles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, and Turks and Caicos Islands.
109. See id. The Category II CARICOM-affiliated territories were: Barbados and
Bermuda.
110. FATF ON MONEY LAUNDERING, OECD, 1999-2000 ANNUAL REPORT ANNEX A,
supra note 8.
111. See id. The FATF member countries are: Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong/China,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Kingdom of the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
United Kingdom and the United States. The two member regional bodies are the
European Commission and the Gulf Co-operation Council.
112. The Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering, FATF (1990) at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/4ORecs-en.htm.
113. See Report on Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories, FATF (2000) at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/FATDocs-en.htm#Non-Cooperative.
114. Id.
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(i) Inadequate commercial law for registration of business
legal entities;
(ii) Lack of identification of beneficial owners.
(3) Obstacles to international cooperation, including:
(i) Obstacles by administrative authorities;
(ii) Obstacles by judicial authorities.
(4) Inadequate resources for preventing and detecting money
laundering activities. 15
Using these criteria, the FATF reviewed twenty-nine OFC
jurisdictions and, on June 22, 2000, issued a report identifying fif-
teen of those jurisdictions as being non-cooperative in the fight
against money laundering."6 Five of the jurisdictions listed were
either full or associate members of CARICOM, or had observer
status within the organization."7
D. Framework for a Collective Memorandum of
Understanding on Eliminating Harmful Tax
Practices
By November 2000, most of the blacklisted countries had not
yet responded to the OECD's tax initiative. On November 24, the
organization published a document entitled Framework for a Col-
lective Memorandum of Understanding on Eliminating Harmful
Tax Practices ("MOU")."5 The MOU provided jurisdictions identi-
fied by the OECD as tax havens with guidelines to demonstrate
their commitment to transparency, non-discrimination and effec-
tive cooperation." 9 The Committee on Fiscal Affairs expressed the
hope that the MOU would provide the framework necessary "to
continue its co-operative dialogue with each jurisdiction."12 ° The
115. FATF ON MONEY LAUNDERING, OECD, 1999-2000 ANNUAL REPORT ANNEX A,
supra note 8.
116. Id. The fifteen countries listed in the report as being uncooperative in the
efforts to stamp out money laundering were: the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Cook
Islands, Commonwealth of Dominica, Israel, Lebanon, Principality of Liechtenstein,
Republic of the Marshall Islands, Republic of Nauru, Niue, Panama, Philippines,
Russia, Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
117. Id. The five CARICOM-affiliated territories listed on the non-cooperative list
were: the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis,
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. CARICOM Website, supra note 31.
118. OECD, FRAMEWORK FOR A COLLECTIVE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON
ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES (2000).
119. Id.
120. Press Release, OECD, OECD Publishes Framework for a Collective
Memorandum of Understanding on Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices (Nov. 24,
2000) available at http://wwwl.oecd.org/media/release/nwOO-123a.htm (last visited
May 30, 2002).
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OECD explained to the tax haven jurisdictions that they could
become parties to the MOU by simply issuing a press release
announcing their commitment to join the OECD tax initiative,
accompanied by a statement of the details of the commitment.'21
While a jurisdiction could have sent an actual letter with a physi-
cal signature to the OECD, such was not absolutely necessary.122
The MOU outlined the terms of the commitment the jurisdic-
tions would be making. The duration of the commitment would be
from July 31, 2001, to December 31, 2005.23 By December 31,
2001, each jurisdiction making the commitment would be required
to adopt a plan to achieve transparency and effective exchange of
information and to eliminate any tax regimes that attract busi-
ness without substantial activity.124 By December 31, 2002, each
jurisdiction had to "ensure that its regulatory or tax authorities
ha[d] access to information regarding beneficial owners of compa-
nies, partnerships and other entities organised in its jurisdiction,"
and to require that such entities adhere to generally accepted
accounting standards in the preparation of their financial state-
ments. 2 ' The MOU further required that by December 31, 2003,
each jurisdiction would establish the legal mechanisms for provid-
ing an effective exchange of information with OECD countries for
criminal tax matters. 26 These countries would also be invited to
participate in the OECD's Global Forum on Taxation, established
to develop a framework for a legal mechanism for exchange of
information. 127 Additionally, each jurisdiction would remove any
existing restrictions on the abilities of entities qualifying for pref-
erential tax treatment to engage in business activity in the domes-
tic market.'28 Finally, the MOU required that, by December 31,
2005, each jurisdiction making the commitment would establish
the means to provide OECD taxing authorities with information
on all tax matters, to ensure access to bank information relevant
121. See generally Letter from the Co-Chairs of the Forum on Harmful Tax
Practices to the Jurisdictions, OECD, Directorate for Financial, Fiscal, and Enter.
Affairs, to Jurisdictions name in "Towards Global Tax Co-operation" (Nov. 20, 2000)
available at http://wwwl.oecd.org/media/MOUletter20nov.pdf (last visited July 2,
2002).
122. Id.
123. OECD, FRAMEWORK FOR A COLLECTIVE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON
ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES, supra note 118, at 2.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. OECD, FRAMEWORK FOR A COLLECTIVE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON
ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAx PRACTICES (Nov. 24, 2000), supra note 118, at 3-4.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 3.
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for civil and/or criminal maters, and to "remove any restrictions
that deny the benefits of preferential tax treatment to resident
taxpayers, to entities owned by resident taxpayers, or to income
derived from doing the same type of business in the domestic
market.'
1 29
The MOU also contained a "stand-still" provision.130 Accord-
ing to this provision, each party to the commitment would refrain
from (1) introducing any new harmful tax practice - as that term
is defined in the OECD 1998 Report on Harmful Tax Competition;
(2) modifying any existing system into one constituting a harmful
tax practice; and (3) strengthening or extending the scope of
existing features that constitute a harmful tax practice under the
1998 Report.' The MOU made clear that the mere entering into
the MOU with the OECD would not be sufficient to prevent a
jurisdiction from being included on the OECD List of Uncoopera-
tive Jurisdictions. 32 Rather, only those jurisdictions that entered
into the MOU and then adhered to its terms would not be included
on the list. 33 The document warned that those jurisdictions that
did not adhere to the terms of the MOU could well have defensive
measures applied against them.
3
1
E. The 2002 List of Uncooperative Tax Havens
On April 18, 2002, the OECD issued its most recent list - the
List of Uncooperative Tax Havens. 31 In a statement issued on the
day the list was issued, OECD Deputy Secretary-General, Seiichi
Kondo, expressed his sorrow that the seven jurisdictions on the
list had "decided that it is not in their interest to join OECD coun-
tries and other members of the international community in ending
harmful tax practices that facilitate tax cheating and distort the
market for financial services." 36 Mr. Kondo boasted that over
thirty other OFCs had already pledged to work with OECD coun-
129. Id. at 3-4.
130. Id. at 4.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 5.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Press Release, OECD, OECD Issues The List of Uncooperative Tax Havens
(April 18, 2002), available at www.oecd.org/EN/document/0,,EN-document-590-17-no-
12-28534-590,00.html (last visited May 30, 2002). The jurisdictions listed on the 2002
List are: Andorra, Principality of Liechtenstein, Liberia, Principality of Monaco,
Republic of the Marshall Islands, Republic of Nauru, and Republic of Vanuatu.
136. Seiichi Kondo, ENDING TAx HAVEN ABUSE (2002).
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tries to counter so-called harmful tax practices. 137 Mr. Kondo went
on to state:
The OECD's project on counteracting harmful tax practices
is part of a wider initiative to promote good governance in a
globalized economy. Globalisation has enormous potential
to improve living standards around the world. But it also
brings risks, including the risk of abuses of the free market
system. The activities of tax havens distort the free flow of
capital and undermine the ability of governments to
finance the legitimate expectations of their citizens for pub-
licly provided goods and services. By providing a frame-
work within which all countries - developed and
developing - can work together to fight harmful tax prac-
tices, the OECD seeks to encourage transparent and fair
tax competition. 38
F. Reasons Underlying the OECD Initiative
Mr. Kondo's statement of April 18, 2002, gives some insight
into the OECD's reasons for embarking on its initiative. The
OECD is obviously concerned about the effects of globalization,
and about the flow of capital from the industrialized countries to
the so-called tax havens. As regards the former, Mr. Kondo is
clear: "Globalization has enormous potential to improve living
standards around the world. But it also brings risks, including
the risk of abuses of the free market system." ' 9 As regards the
free flow of capital, Mr. Kondo blamed the so-called tax havens for
distorting this free flow of capital and thereby undermining "the
ability of governments to finance the legitimate expectations of
their citizens for publicly provided goods and services."140
Certainly, in this computer and electronic age, the earth has
been reduced to one big global village. This is particularly so in
the realm of international finance. Transactions which once took
weeks or days to complete can now be made with the simple click
of a button on a computer mouse. Additionally, it is now very easy
for an individual or business entity to move its headquarters or
base of operations from a high-tax to a low-tax or no-tax jurisdic-
tion. Consequently, ever-increasing amounts of capital are being






havens. Harmful Tax Competition itself indicated that in 1994,
residents of the G7 countries invested over $200 billion in various
Caribbean and South Pacific islands, representing more than a
500% increase over the aggregate amount invested in 1985.141
Statistics also indicate that while traditional tax havens account
for only 1.2% of the world's population, and only 3% of the world's
GDP, they account for 25% of U.S. multinationals' assets and 31%
of their net profits.1
2
In such a setting, with the tax base of the industrialized coun-
tries slowly being eroded, it is safe to say that globalization has
indeed intensified international tax competition. The OECD, find-
ing itself on the losing side of this battle, is doing its best to
impede its progress."4 In fact, the very title of the OECD's 1998
report - "Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue"
- reveals the OECD's stance on the issue of international tax
competition. The contents of the report make it clear that the Rec-
ommendations and Guidelines contained therein, along with the
OECD Tax Initiative, are nothing but the OECD's attempt to
eliminate the "harmful tax havens" and "preferential tax regimes"
that are eating at the member countries' tax bases.14
Yet, the OECD, at least in its official statements, disavows
any such motive. Upon the issuance of the 2002 List of Uncooper-
ative Tax Havens, OECD Deputy Secretary-General Kondo stated:
The OECD does not seek to dictate to any country what its
tax rate should be, or how its tax system should be struc-
tured. It does not seek to hinder enterprises in carrying out
their normal business or to threaten the privacy of taxpay-
ers. It aims to foster economic growth and development
and ensure efficient and equitable flow of capital world-
wide by promoting fair competition on tax rates. By getting
commitments from more than thirty offshore financial cen-
ters to cooperate in fighting harmful tax practices, we are
helping to protect the tax base not only of OECD countries
but also of developing countries. By promoting trans-
parency and cooperative agreements between all econo-
mies, our work will contribute to efforts to counter money
laundering and the financing of terrorism (and strengthen
141. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 2, at 17.
142. See Mathew Bishop, A Survey of Globalization and Tax, THE ECONOMIST,
Jan. 29, 2000, at 17.
143. See, Mitchell B. Weiss, International Tax Competition: An Efficient or
Inefficient Phenomenon?, 16 AKRON TAX J. 99, 122 (2001).
144. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 2, at 37.
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the international financial system).14
Notwithstanding the OECD's disclaimers, some commenta-
tors are convinced that, through its Tax Initiative, the organiza-
tion has acted as a typical schoolyard bully, seeking to impose its
will on the developing countries of the world. 146 Commentator
Alexander Townsend, Jr., opines that "the OECD's 1998 and 2000
Reports addressing tax competition mark a coercive and intrusive
solution that deviates from traditional fiscal remedies.' 1 47 Town-
send argues further that notwithstanding the substantive find-
ings of Harmful Tax Competition and the 2000 Report, the
OECD's "efforts to curb tax competition marks a substantial
deviation from the treaty network established to address interna-
tional fiscal problems and usurps a basic tenet of fiscal legislation:
national sovereignty."'48  Indeed, Harmful Tax Competition
requires tax competitive jurisdictions to make significant changes
in their fiscal legislation and policies. 4  Although the OECD
claims that non-OECD members have the option to voluntarily
participate in the efforts against so-called harmful tax competi-
tion, 5 ° the mere threat of listed jurisdictions being subjected to
the defensive measures outlined in the 2000 Report effectively
coerces these jurisdictions into an involuntary compliance.'
III. CARICOM REACTION TO THE OECD LIsTS
Throughout the CARICOM countries, people of all walks of
life reacted strongly to the inclusion of their territories on the
OECD, FATF and FSF lists issued in 2000. Among the "ordinary
citizens," a significant minority had a blurred understanding of
the different lists, and assumed that being on the OECD List of
Tax Havens meant that their countries had been included on a list
of countries giving respite to money launderers. 2 Those citizens
145. Kondo, supra note 136.
146. Interview with Lebrecht Hesse, Solicitor General, Antigua and Barbuda, and
Chairman, Int'l Financial Sector Regulatory Authority, Antigua and Barbuda, in St.
John's, Antigua (June 5, 2002); see also Townsend, supra note 16.
147. See Townsend, supra note 16, at 251.
148. Id. at 252.
149. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 2, at 37, 67-71.
150. See Kondo, supra note 136 (stating that OECD does not seek to dictate to any
country what its tax rate should be or how its tax system should be structured); see
also OECD, 2000 Report, supra note 3, at 20-21 (noting OECD's intention to assist
jurisdictions with compliance and to further obtain additional information).
151. Townsend, supra note 16, at 252.
152. Interview with Gertrude Lecointe-Marius, Esq., citizen, in St. Croix, Virgin Is.
(May 30, 2002); Interview with Erol Meryl, Esq., citizen, in St. Croix Virgin Is. (June
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believed that their leaders erred, and that the OECD rightly
included their countries on the List of Tax Havens. On the other
hand, the majority of the CARICOM citizens were aghast that
their countries were included on the List of Tax Havens.'53 Many
wondered just why their countries had been included on the list.5
In their minds, the listing was simply unfair.'55 Moreover, they
reasoned, the listing was not a reaction by the OECD to money
laundering, but rather the organization's response to the flight of
capital from the industrialized world to the developing countries
of the Caribbean. 5 '
Among government officials, the CARICOM reaction was
strongly condemnatory. Led by Barbados Prime Minister Owen
Arthur, the CARICOM countries complained about the apparent
double standards utilized by the OECD. 57 The countries argued
that while the OECD demanded compliance from the CARICOM
members, some OECD members, specifically Switzerland and
Luxembourg, refused to comply with the OECD's demands.5 8
Implying that the OECD countries were merely greedy powers
attempting to hold on to their share of the world's wealth, CAR-
ICOM leaders argued that the OECD's aim was simply to cut
small developing states out of offshore finance. 159 This objective
would be unfair, they maintained, for, as Antigua's Senior Ambas-
sador with Ministerial Rank and High Commissioner to the
United Kingdom, Ronald Sanders, stated, "many countries in the
Caribbean were encouraged by the international community to go
into the offshore financial services sector as a means of enhancing
their earning power, and reducing their dependence on support
from other countries." 6 ° Now that the offshore sector was picking
up steam, these same industrialized nations were trying to shut it
down.'6
1, 2002); Interview with an anonymous citizen, Ant. & Barb. (June 3-6, 2002);
Interview with George Williams, supra note 208; Interview with an anonymous
citizen, in London, Eng. (July 15-21, 2002).
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157. U.S. Eases Stance on "Tax Havens", BBC NEWS (London), July 20, 2001,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/business/1446603.stm (last visited May 30, 2002).
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160. Ronald M. Sanders, Statement at the OECD Forum in Sydney, Australia
(Oct. 5, 1999), at http://www.antigua-barbuda.com/busnss-politics/body-foreign-
policy.html (last visited June 12, 2002).
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Moreover, Ambassador Sanders has maintained a barrage of
criticism on the OECD and its tax initiative. After the OECD pub-
lished Harmful Tax Competition, Ambassador Sanders described
the report as:
an attempt [by the OECD] to force all countries over which
there is some measure of coercive influence and control to
co-operate in the implementation and enforcement of a
standardized system of taxation even though such a system
may effectively place small countries at a severe disadvan-
tage in building or creating financial services sectors.162
Ambassador Sanders saw this "attack on the movement of money
from OECD countries into countries such as those in the Carib-
bean" as "extremely troubling," and called for "the most concerted
action by the affected countries in resisting it."'
Two years later, after the OECD issued its List of Tax
Havens, Ambassador Sanders warned that the CARICOM coun-
tries included on the list were "victims of the worst form of bully-
ing by big, strong and powerful nations that the world has
witnessed since the 19th Century."" Distinguishing the OECD
and FATF lists, the Antiguan ambassador pointed out that the
OECD tax initiative was "not about money laundering and finan-
cial crime" or "about offshore banks only."165 According to Ambas-
sador Sanders, "[tihe OECD ha[d] deliberately allowed an ill-
informed international media to assume that the [tax initiative
was] directed at curbing money laundering because this has won
[the OECD] support."1 66  In summary, Ambassador Sanders
described the OECD tax initiative as "nothing less than a deter-
mined attempt [by the OECD] to bend other countries to its will,
... a form of neo-colonialism in which the OECD is attempting to
dictate the tax economic systems and structures of other nations
for the benefit of the OECD's member states."67
Caribbean bankers also swiftly condemned the OECD initia-
tive. Even before the OECD issued its List of Tax Havens, a group
162. Ronald M. Sanders, The OECD Report on "Harmful Taxation" and Its
Implications for'Small States (Mar. 27, 2001), at http://www.antigua-barbuda.com/
busnss-politics/body-foreign-policy.html#oecdstatement (last visited July 12, 2002).
163. Id.
164. Ronald M. Sanders, The OECD's "Harmful Tax Competition" Scheme: The
Implications for Antigua and Barbuda (Mar. 27, 2001), at http://www.antigua-
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of Caribbean bankers took a pre-emptive strike at the list, label-
ing it as an attempt to punish those regions that made their tax
rates more attractive. 68 Speaking for the group of bankers, Penny
Ettinger, vice-president of Barbados-based Bayshore Bank, told a
Miami Business Conference that the OECD was "trying to act as
global tax police"1 69 in undertaking its tax initiatives. Moreover,
Ms. Ettinger opined, the OECD confused the concepts of tax eva-
sion and tax avoidance, perceiving tax avoidance "as 'tax leakage'
from holes in the dike." 7 °
Hot on the heels of Ms. Ettinger's statement, Marion Wil-
liams, governor of the Central Bank of Barbados, and Julian Fran-
cis, governor of the Central Bank of the Bahamas, writing in The
Financial Regulator, criticized the OECD's initiative.'71 Williams
argued that the OECD's proposals to blacklist "uncooperative" off-
shore financial centers were illegitimate and constituted an abuse
of the organization's power. 172 For his part, Francis argued that
the OECD initiative - aimed at "putting serious criminals out of
business by attacking the financial jugular of small developing
countries - [was] counterproductive." 73
After the OECD issued the List of Tax Havens in June 2000,
Caribbean bankers stepped up their criticism of the organization's
tax initiative. Referring to the blacklisting of the Caribbean coun-
tries, president of the Caribbean Development Bank ("CDB"),
Neville Nicholls, accused the OECD members of using "shameless
self-serving tactics" to blacklist small countries as tax havens so
that these wealthy countries could protect their own financial sec-
tors.'74 According to Nicholls, the OECD's effort to stop what it
labeled "harmful tax practices" was only a "desire to recapture
business lost to such jurisdictions."175 Nicholls further accused the
OECD of "using its fight against money laundering as an excuse to
168. Caribbean Bankers Condemn OECD Offshore Blacklist , PRIVATE BANKER
INT'L, Jan. 2000, available at http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/mOFQA/2000jan/
63903764/print.jhtml (last visited June 12, 2002).
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Threaten Small States, Says Caribbean Central Bank Governor (Apr. 4, 2000), at
http://www.centralbanking.co.uk/pressrelease/fr44pr.htm (last visited May 22, 2002).
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174. Associated Press, Caribbean Development Bank Head Attacks OECD
Blacklists (Feb. 8, 2001), available at http://www.freedomand prosperity.org/Articles/
ap02-08-01]ap02-08-01.shtml (last visited May 22, 2002).
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alter Caribbean nations' competitive low-tax regimes to the bene-
fit of banks in richer countries."176
Other Caribbean bankers and business people joined the CDB
president in criticizing the now-released List of Tax Havens.
Julian Francis, governor of the Bahamas Central Bank, opined
that the list would leave "a bitter taste in the mouth of Bahami-
ans, who realise [sic] that [they] are being bullied by some of
[their] friends."177 In the same tone, Phillip Nicholls, president of
the Canada Barbados Business Association, stated that the OECD
blacklist sent conflicting signals to investors who regarded Barba-
dos as being a "top-class jurisdiction for international tax plan-
ning." "' Meanwhile, Dominican Finance Minister, Ambrose
George, expressed his "disappointment with the . . . unprece-
dented and largely unfounded attacks on the growth of the
[Dominican] offshore sector." '79 Mr. George also spoke of his
inability "to comprehend the motivation for this latest threat to
[the island nation's] economic sovereignty."8 0
Even after the OECD issued its most recent list (the List of
Uncooperative Tax Havens) on April 18, 2002, CARICOM leaders
and commentators were still seething over the inclusion of their
territories on the 2000 List of Tax Havens - even though the new
list contained no CARICOM-affiliated countries. Antiguan Solici-
tor General, Lebrecht Hesse, bluntly stated that "[t]he OECD's
mission is to destroy the emerging money markets of the newly
developing countries because [such an emergence] reduces their
capital." '' Hesse also accused the OECD of killing the economic
diversification of the Caribbean island nations.8 2 Echoing that
theme, Denzil Douglas, Prime Minister of the Federation of St.
Kitts and Nevis, stated that the impact on the Caribbean coun-
tries of the blacklisting would be worse than the effects of the ter-
rorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.13
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Douglas went on to note that because of the blacklisting, the pros-
pect for real investment flows to the Caribbean region grew
increasingly bleak.'
IV. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE OECD LISTING ON
CARICOM NATIONS
Undoubtedly, the OECD List of Tax Havens had a significant
negative impact on the economies of the CARICOM nations
included on that list. Indeed, this detrimental economic effect was
apparently just what the OECD hoped for. In launching its tax
initiative, the OECD stated its belief that the blacklisting would
have an adverse impact on the economies of jurisdictions thus
listed, essentially because some reputable companies, unwilling to
do business in jurisdictions burdened with negative overtones,
would relocate their activities to other jurisdictions.'85 However,
the OECD pointed out, should those blacklisted jurisdictions com-
mit to adopting the new standards - and continue to comply -
they could, in the long run, regain some of their lost business6
In fact, to help these jurisdictions get through that rough period of
economic downturn, the OECD asked its Development Assistance
Committee to aid them, and prepared to conduct conferences and
meetings with international organizations to discuss development
plans for those jurisdictions.'87
The CARICOM countries were well aware of the potential eco-
nomic impact of being blacklisted by the OECD. Even Barbados,
undoubtedly the most economically stable CARICOM country,
stood to be affected by the OECD blacklisting. After all, Barbados
boasts "an efficient infrastructure and a Government that encour-
ages foreign investment ... by offering tax breaks."' Addition-
ally, the Barbadian offshore finance and information services
sectors are important foreign exchange earners."9 The financial
services industry employs approximately two thousand people,
CARIBUPDATE.COM, June 13, 2002, available at http://www.caribupdate.com/
JUN%2013%2OSt%Kitts%20PM%20on%20blacklisting.htm (last visited June 13,
2002)(on file with author).
184. Id.
185. See Jeffrey Owens, Towards World Tax Co-operation, OECD OBSERVER, Oct.
19, 2000 (on file with author).
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30.
189. CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2001, available at www.odci.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/bb.html (last visited July 5, 2002).
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directly affects other industries, and provides about one-third of
government revenues. 9 ° Because the Barbadian industries are
highly interrelated, a collapse of the financial services industry
would have "dire social and economic consequences," leading to
other serious social ills like corruption and crime. 9' Hence, from
the onset, Barbados's Prime Minister, Owen Arthur, was con-
cerned about his country's inclusion on the OECD's List of Tax
Havens.
Of all the CARICOM countries, the twin-island nation of
Antigua and Barbuda appears to be the hardest hit by the OECD's
blacklisting. In April 1999, even before the OECD included the
islands on its List of Tax Havens, the United States and Britain
issued an "advisory" to their financial institutions, recommending
"enhanced scrutiny" for transactions in Antigua and Barbuda.192
In an effort to have the advisories lifted, the government of Anti-
gua and Barbuda took several measures to bring its offshore
financial sector in line with the requirements of the Americans
and British. With the help of the British government, the twin-
island nation made significant changes to its laws governing the
offshore financial services sector.'93 The government also estab-
lished a fully independent International Financial Sector Regula-
tory Authority ("IFSRA"), and took the extra precaution of
clearing the names of the members of its board of directors with
the governments of both the United States and the United King-
dom.'94 To the detriment of the nation's economy, between the end
of 1999 and August 2000, the government reduced the number of
offshore banks operating in the territory from seventy-two to eigh-
teen, and the number of international business corporations from
12,378 to 10,797.95 Of the offshore insurance companies regis-
tered in Antigua and Barbuda, the government placed all on inac-
190. Caribbean Tax Havens in Spotlight, supra note 178; see also Akiko Hishikawa,
The Death of Tax Havens?, 25 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 389, 403 (2002).
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tive status, and subsequently struck them from the country's
corporate registry. 196 With the government taking such drastic
measures, by the time the OECD published its List of Tax Havens,
the twin-island nation was already undergoing a financial
drought. 197 The inclusion of Antigua and Barbuda on the OECD
List of Tax Havens only made matters worse.
As an initial matter, some foreign companies, wary of doing
business in a blacklisted jurisdiction, relocated their activities out
of Antigua and Barbuda. 9 8 Then, in an effort to avoid having the
islands listed on the upcoming List of Uncooperative Tax Havens,
the government undertook various efforts to comply with the
OECD's demands, such as further amending legislation which it
had already amended to satisfy the demands of the American and
British governments.'99 These changes in legislation had two
effects: (1) some of the offshore institutions operating on the
islands were found to be falling short of the required standards,
and (2) some offshore institutions, fearing they would not be able
to meet the new standards, moved their operations out of Antigua
and Barbuda. °° Thus, whereas the islands were once home to sev-
enty-two offshore banks, by the summer of 2002, only eighteen
remained. 2°1 Not only were the islands affected by loss of fees and
other revenue resulting from the exodus of the offshore banks, but
their departure also resulted in loss of employment for the
Antiguans they once employed, with the resultant decrease in the
nation's GDP.
2 °1
Along with Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica and St. Vincent
and the Grenadines, two CARICOM member countries against
whom the United States also issued financial advisories, suffered
greatly from the OECD blacklisting. The former, having had its
economy devastated first by Hurricane David in 1979203 and then
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197. See All Havens in a Storm, THE ECONOMIST, July 1, 2000, at 114.
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199. CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2001, available at www.odci.gov/cia/publications/
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by Hurricane Luis in 1995,204 turned to the financial services sec-
tor to diversify its economy. In 1996, the Dominican government
established a re-engineered Economic Citizenship Program aimed
at attracting quality investors to the island "while attempting to
keep out the snake of international crime. "205 By December 1998,
173 investors had successfully applied for economic citizenship in
Dominica.2 °6 It was also during 1998 that the government of then-
Prime Minister Edison James announced its plans to "make Domi-
nica a principal provider of offshore financial services not only in
the Caribbean, but the world."2 °7
Sadly for Dominica, it was also in 1998 that the OECD
launched its tax initiative. At that time, the Dominican offshore
financial sector was still in its embryonic stage. Satisfied that it
was establishing a "clean regime," the Dominican government did
not believe that the OECD Recommendations and Guidelines
were applicable to the island's fledgling offshore sector.28 To the
government's shock and consternation, in 2000, Dominica
appeared on both the FATF list of jurisdictions deemed non-coop-
erative in the fight against money laundering and the OECD List
of Tax Havens.29
During the months following the publication of the blacklists,
the situation worsened for the Dominican offshore financial sec-
tor. On February 5, 2001, Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.), the
Ranking Democrat on the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations, released the results of a year-long investigation
by his subcommittee staff on how U.S. banks were being used by
foreign banks to launder the proceeds of criminal activity.210 The
204. CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2001, available at www.odci.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/do.html (last visited July 7, 2002).
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report labeled Dominica "a small bank secrecy jurisdiction in the
Caribbean," and asserted that one of the island's offshore banks
had moved more than $85 million through U.S. banks, "including
millions of dollars associated with money laundering, financial
frauds and illegal gambling operations on the Internet."21' The
subject bank protested the negative assertion, arguing that cer-
tain "bureaucrats ha[d] used the far-reaching powers of the
United States government to obtain incomplete information, [and]
use[d] it in an intrusive and sensational fashion to draw conclu-
sions that [were] neither warranted nor accurate."212
The bank's protestations notwithstanding, the government, in
an effort to comply with OECD demands, ordered the bank's
license revoked and directed the accounting firm, Price-
waterhouseCoopers, to oversee the liquidation of the bank's
assets.213 Meanwhile, the government also established a Financial
Intelligence Unit and an advisory council to supervise the offshore
financial services sector.1 4
In the final analysis, the blacklisting seriously affected the
Dominican economy. Not only did the government revoke the
license of one bank, but several others fled the island. This flight
resulted in further decline of the island's economy. By June 2002,
with unemployment high and the economy in near-shambles, the
government of Prime Minister Pierre Charles presented the island
nation with a "tax-filled" national budget featuring significant
increases in fuel, sales, and telecommunications and cable ser-
vices taxes, along with cuts in the size of the government's
cabinet.1 5
The multi-island nation of St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Into High Risk Foreign Banks Released Today (Feb. 5, 2001), available at http://levin.
senate.gov/releases/020501prl.htm (last visited July 29, 2002).
211. Id.
212. Caribbean News Agency [herinafter CANA] Report, Dominica Offshore Bank
Refutes U.S. Report on Money Laundering (Feb. 9, 2001), available at http://www.
cananews.com/cbibusinessupdatel232.htm (last visited July 29, 2002).
213. Gregg Fields & Mimi Whitefield, Caribbean Governments Close Suspect
Foreign-Owned Financial Institutions, MIArMI HERALD, Feb. 21, 2001, available at
http://www.moneylaundering.com/NewsArticles/MiamiHerald3.htm (last visited July
29, 2002).
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Caribbean Development Bank Board of Governors, at http://www.caribank.org/
BOG.nsf/pages/Dom (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).
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suffered a similar economic decline in the face of the OECD and
FATF blacklisting.216 Like Dominica, St. Vincent and the Grena-
dines had, in the mid-1990s, "launched an economic diversifica-
tion program and strengthened measures to deal with the decline
in the banana industry."217 In 1996, the government revised the
laws governing the offshore financial sector. 218 As a result, the
sector experienced rapid growth. At one point, the sector boasted
11,400 registered entities, of which 28 were banks, 608 trusts, and
the rest international business companies. 2 9 The IMF estimated
that the offshore financial sector contributed EC$30 million (3.5
percent of GDP) in 1999 in fees, employment, rentals, and use of
utilities .220
Unfortunately for St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 1999 was
the last year of prosperity for the offshore financial sector. In
2000, both the OECD and the FATF included the multi-island
nation on their blacklists. Concerned, the government enacted
measures intended to strengthen the supervisory and regulatory
framework for offshore activities - including the increase in staff
and amendments to existing lawsY.2 2 The measures also included
the closure of several banks and insurance companies operating
on the islands. 222 With an unemployment rate of 25-40%,223 St.
Vincent and the Grenadines has been devastated by the economic
losses brought on by the closures and revocations.
Indeed, the story is the same throughout the Caribbean. All
the blacklisted countries have been severely affected by their
inclusion on the OECD List of Tax Havens. Those countries unfor-
tunate enough to be included on both the OECD and FATF lists
have suffered the greatest economic hardship.
However, it is not only in the economic realm that the OECD
216. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, PUBLIC INFORMATION NOTICE (PIN) No.
00/96, IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with St. Vincent and the Grenadines
(Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2000/pn0096.htm
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has had an impact on CARICOM, but the impact has also been felt
in the area of sovereignty. In their efforts to be removed from the
blacklists, CARICOM countries have capitulated to the OECD,
and in so doing, have surrendered their sovereign rights to be
masters of their respective tax and economic policies. The next
section of this article addresses this important issue.
V. A MATTER OF SOVEREIGNTY: How THE OECD PIRATED
CARICOM INDEPENDENCE
As noted previously, CARICOM countries reacted strongly to
their inclusion on the OECD blacklist.224 Their reaction was even
stronger when, in response to the FATF's issuance of its list of
uncooperative countries and territories in the fight against money
laundering, the United States Treasury Department issued
advisories against five CARICOM member nations, asking Ameri-
can financial institutions to give "extra scrutiny" to transactions
with those countries.225 Barbados's Prime Minister, Owen Arthur,
CARICOM's leading spokesperson on the OECD initiative,
referred to the issuing of the advisories as a "snow job" on the part
of the United States and other OECD governments.2 26 According
to Mr. Arthur, the OECD's "reference to so much dirty money in
the Caribbean is strange, since more dirty money passes through
places like New York and London every day than in all the coun-
tries of the Caribbean."227 Mr. Arthur's comments were in keeping
with the sentiments expressed by CARICOM leaders meeting in
St. Vincent and the Grenadines in early July 2000, who criticized
the OECD initiative as being "inconsistent with international
practice. 228
Notwithstanding their annoyance at the OECD, the CAR-
ICOM nations found themselves unable to halt the OECD tax ini-
tiative. However, taking Mr. Arthur's advice that the countries
act as a united force in the matter,229 CARICOM countries stood
together to negotiate with the OECD. Throughout the year 2001,
CARICOM participated in extensive discussions with the OECD,
to no avail. The OECD was adamant: capitulate or face economic
224. See supra Part III.
225. CANA Report, Prime Minister Hits Out at U.S. (July 17, 2000), available at
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death and international ostracism. It was not until the new
Republican administration in the United States withdrew its sup-
port for the OECD initiative that the organization adopted a less
aggressive approach.
A. The Barbados Consultation, January 8-9, 2001
The first negotiation session between the OECD and CAR-
ICOM was held in Barbados from January 8-9, 2001.230 OECD
officials met with representatives from the CARICOM member
states, the IMF, the World Bank, the United Nations, the World
Trade Organization, relevant regional organizations, and the
OECD's Development Assistance Committee, ostensibly to
improve the dialogue between the OECD and the targeted juris-
dictions. 231 According to the OECD, the meeting's objective was to
establish early confidence building measures, develop a common
perspective in the effort to eliminate harmful tax practices, and to
examine ways to improve the administrative and regulatory capa-
bilities of the blacklisted jurisdictions and provide assistance in
restructuring their economies if necessary.232 An important out-
come of the meeting was the parties' agreement to set up a task
force to replace the OECD's process noted in the MOU.
233
Speaking as host of the conference but also expressing the
views of the CARICOM countries, Barbados Prime Minister Owen
Arthur explained to participants that the service sector was the
fastest growing area of the global economy and that everyone
should be allowed to share in that market.234 He opined that the
integrity of the international financial system and the prevention
of tax crimes could be achieved only through cooperation and an
agreement to establish an international standard of regulation,
operation and practices.235 Prime Minister Arthur expressed his
belief that a process of meaningful dialogue among the parties,
230. Bruce Zagaris, Consultations in Barbados on OECD Harmful Tax Competition
Initiative Yield Progress, 17 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 50, 1 (2001).
231. Id.
232. OECD News Release, OECD, Commonwealth Secretariat to Organize High-
Level Consultations on Tax and Competition Issues in the Global Financial market
(Jan. 2, 2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/EN/document/O,,EN-document-590-
17-no-12-7457-590,00.html (last visited July 7, 2002).
233. Zagaris, supra note 230, at 1. The task force included the following countries:
Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Cook Islands,
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without coercion or the threat of arbitrary deadlines, could
achieve an understanding to move towards a mutually beneficial
resolution of the dispute."' Prime Minister Arthur discouraged
the use of unilateral actions by any one country or a group of coun-
tries - such as the OECD - as a means of resolving the per-
ceived global problem of harmful tax practices." 7
Speaking on behalf of its members, the CARICOM Secretariat
stated that its "members [would] continue to cooperate with any
attempt to build a sounder international financial architecture
and to develop international best practices."2 s The Secretariat
noted that most CARICOM member states had already made sev-
eral changes to their tax regimes to adhere with international
standards.239 Further, the Secretariat stated, in 1999, CARICOM
members created a Policy Advisory Committee to review the legis-
lative and administrative framework of various member jurisdic-
tions, and in 2000, created the Caribbean Association of
Regulators of International Business ("CARIB") to advance the
reform process.24 ° However, the Secretariat noted that some of its
members, especially the Bahamas and the member-states of the
OECS, 241 had become dependent on the offshore sector and had
therefore expressed concern that the process should take into
account the special situation of the small and developing coun-
tries.242 The Secretariat went on record as "strongly" supporting
the dialogue and negotiation process.243
In addressing the conference, Neville Nicholls, president of
the Caribbean Development Bank, warned that the Caribbean
countries should not be required to behave like the OECD mem-
bers.244 Mr. Nicholls saw "[d]ifferences in resource endowments,
resource accessibility, patterns of utilization, and, critically impor-
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their counterparts in the Caribbean.245 The CDB president also
stated that international cooperation and the principles of self-
determination required that countries not impose their own cul-
tures on others.246
Inasmuch as several of the blacklisted countries were mem-
bers of the Commonwealth, the conference was also addressed by
Commonwealth Secretary-General, Don McKinnon. Mr. McKin-
non opined that given its agenda, the conference would not pro-
duce a mutually acceptable definition of a harmful tax practice or
the level of investigative assistance to be provided by one country
to another.247 He therefore suggested that the goal of the meeting
should be to adopt common principles which would evolve over
time into mutually accepted definitions and agreed-upon levels of
inter-state involvement.2 48 Mr. McKinnon noted the opposition of
Commonwealth member states to the OECD's actions, actions
that challenged those states' sovereignty over their domestic tax
affairs and threatened them with sanctions for not yielding to the
OECD.249 He also recommended that the "MOU... be reworked
into a 'convention by agreement between equal partners.
' '250
Responding to the statements of the various delegations,
OECD Deputy Secretary General, Seiichi Kondo, stated that the
OECD did not want to establish minimum tax rates or to interfere
with the privacy of individual citizens.251 Rather, Mr. Kondo
stated, the OECD encouraged competition between different tax
regimes in a globalized economy, and supported competition that
promotes diversity in tax systems while allowing countries to
decide their own tax rates and structure.252 Mr. Kondo acknowl-
edged that the OECD initiative had created uncertainty, an
uncertainty that needed to be resolved quickly through dialogue
with interested parties to eliminate harmful tax practices.253
Overall, observers hailed the Barbados conference as a suc-
cess. 254 Essentially, the OECD implicitly withdrew the deadlines
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replace the deadlines contained in the MOU. 256 Yet, the OECD did
not agree to remove the MOU, the deadlines, or the sanctions, and
maintained its right to "impose unilateral sanctions after July 31,
2001.,257
B. Task Force Meeting, London, January 26-28, 2001
Soon after the Barbados conference, the newly-created task
force met in London for a summit to prepare guidelines to develop
a mutually acceptable process by which the principles of trans-
parency, non-discrimination, and effective exchange of informa-
tion could evolve into firm commitments.25 Ministers and senior
officials from the member countries of the task force attended the
summit, along with representatives of the OECD, CARICOM, and
the Pacific Islands Forum.259 The OECD's objective for this sum-
mit was to obtain public political commitments from as many
jurisdictions as possible in order that those jurisdictions would not
be included on the List of Non-Cooperative Tax Havens, originally
due for publication in July 200 1.260
The London summit was grossly unsuccessful. The two spon-
sors, the OECD and the Commonwealth Secretariat, engaged in a
war of words, with the Commonwealth accusing the OECD of"dic-
tatorial behavior," and the OECD, in turn, accusing the Common-
wealth of acting like an "irritant to the process. "261 Diane Stafford,
Commonwealth Director of Legal and Constitutional Affairs,
argued that the OECD tax initiative was unfairly concerned with
mobile capital, in the process disregarding the tax-related invest-
ment practices of OECD members.262 For their part, OECD offi-
cials denied such charges of partiality, pointing out that the list of
harmful tax regimes included OECD members.263 Cheryl Dorall,
256. Nations Agree to Task Force on "Tax Havens," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2001, at A5,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/10/world.10IHAVE.html (last visited
July 7, 2002), cited in Hishikawa, supra note 190, at 407.
257. Zagaris, supra note 230, at 5.
258. OECD Tax Haven Summit Opens with Accusations of Bad Faith, AFX NEWS,
Jan. 26, 2001, available at 2001 WL 10282955, cited in Hishikawa, supra note 190, at
407.
259. Agreement Elusive Between OECD and Offshore Centers, INTL MONEY
MARKETING, Feb. 8, 2001, available at 2001 WL 13947400.
260. OECD News Release (Jan. 26, 2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/media/
release/nwOl-09a.htm (last visited July 7, 2002).
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the Commonwealth Secretariat spokesperson, described the two
sides as being far from agreement in determining the strategy to
develop on the issues of transparency, non-discrimination, and
effective exchange of information.2"
Essentially, the task force failed to create an agreement on
how to combat tax evasion and money laundering.265 In a joint
statement issued after the meeting, the sponsors stated that they
would continue their dialogue in an effort to come to a mutual
agreement.266 Yet, the OECD did not relax its July 2001 deadline
for receipt of commitments from non-OECD member countries.267
C. OECD-Commonwealth Task Force Meeting, Paris,
March 1-2, 2001
The third meeting between the OECD and CARICOM repre-
sentatives took place in Paris on March 1-2, 2001.26 The meeting
was attended by ministers and senior finance and tax officials
from the thirteen countries represented on the task force, along
with Prime Minister Arthur of Barbados, Tony Hilton, Australia's
ambassador to the OECD, representatives of the Commonwealth
Secretariat, the OECD Secretariat, and the CARIB Secretariat.269
The Commonwealth countries introduced several new propos-
als, including (1) full membership in the OECD for non-members
involved in the anti-harmful tax competition initiative, (2) the
ability to stop the initiative if the OECD members failed to com-
ply, and (3) the "continuation of a collective rather than bilateral
approach to negotiation."27 °  The Commonwealth countries
expressed their willingness to work with the OECD, but empha-
sized that the terms had to be suitable to them.271
The Commonwealth countries also argued that the OECD's
threat of sanctions was "high-handed and undemocratic." 27 2 They
264. Agreement Elusive Between OECD and Offshore Centers, supra note 259.
265. Commonwealth and OECD Fail to Agree on Anti-Tax Evasion Campaign,
AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Jan. 28, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2331102.
266. Id.
267. Agreement Elusive Between OECD and Offshore Centers, supra note 259.
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INTER PRESS SERVICE, March 4, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4802950.
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asked the OECD to postpone the July 2001 deadline, but once
again, the OECD refused.273 Annoyed at the OECD's seeming
intransigence, Prime Minister Arthur of Barbados accused the
organization of "'technocratic tyranny' by 'nameless, faceless peo-
ple' with no common sense."274 He also accused the OECD of
employing double standards by holding the Commonwealth coun-
tries to the July 2001 deadline, while allowing OECD members
until 2003 to eliminate their harmful tax practices.275 As a final
matter, the targeted Commonwealth countries asserted that they
were legitimate financial centers, and argued that the United
Nations would be the appropriate framework to achieve the elimi-
nation of harmful tax practices, rather than direct pressure being
applied by the OECD. 6
The Paris meeting ended in deadlock, with the parties failing
to reach an agreement. 277 The meeting mandated Barbados's
Prime Minister Arthur and Australia's ambassador to the OECD,
Tony Hilton, to continue negotiations.278 By then, though, it was
doubtful that the parties would ever arrive at an amicable
solution.
D. Change of Course in the United States
The impasse was broken by a relatively unexpected occur-
rence. In the United States, the Clinton Administration had given
strong support to the OECD initiative.279 When George W. Bush
took office as President in January 2001, CARICOM leaders were
expecting a different approach from the new administration."'
Accordingly, CARICOM leaders exerted considerable efforts in
making their case to the new Secretary of the Treasury, Paul
O'Neill, Congressional Republicans, and the Congressional Black
Standards at Tax Havens Talks, THE GUARDIAN (London), March 3, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 14955197.
273. OECD Tax Haven Talks Discuss Fresh Proposals, But July Deadline Remains,
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Caucus.281 Prime Minister of Antigua, Lester Bird, even discussed
the matter directly with President Bush.282
In May 2001, Secretary O'Neill announced that the United
States was withdrawing its support for the OECD initiative.2 s3
According to Secretary O'Neill, he was "troubled by the underlying
premise that low tax rates are somehow suspect and by the notion
that any country, or group of countries, should interfere in any
other country's decision about how to structure its own tax sys-
tem. 28 4 Secretary O'Neill also voiced his concern about the poten-
tial unfair treatment of some non-OECD countries under the
provisions of the tax initiative. 25 The Treasury Secretary force-
fully reiterated that the United States "d[id] not support efforts to
dictate to any country what its own tax rates or tax system should
be, and w[ould] not participate in any initiative to harmonize
world tax systems."2 6 According to Secretary O'Neill, the United
States "simply has no interest in stifling the competition that
forces governments - like businesses - to create efficiencies."2 7
Although he acknowledged the accomplishments of the OECD,
Secretary O'Neill stated that the OECD initiative - in its then-
existing form - was too broad and should be refocused towards
the need for the exchange of specific information in the detection
and prevention of illegal tax evasion.2 8
Initially, the OECD announced that it would defy the Bush
Administration and press on with the tax initiative.2 9 Reason
eventually prevailed, however, and the organization decided to
seek some form of U.S. cooperation instead. Consequently, the
OECD scheduled a meeting for tax officials from the United States
and other industrialized countries for Paris in June 2001.9 At
281. Id.
282. Id.
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that meeting, the OECD essentially gave in to U.S. demands and
agreed to a less aggressive approach to its tax initiative. 291 The
OECD made a major concession, agreeing that it would not
impose sanctions on tax havens that simply offered favorable tax
breaks to foreign companies and investors (also called "ring fenc-
ing").292 In return, the United States agreed to continue its cam-
paign to have targeted jurisdictions disclose various account
information of those suspected of tax evasion to the Internal Reve-
nue Service and the OECD tax authorities.293 To the delight of the
CARICOM countries, the negotiations led to several modifications
to the OECD's original plan.294
These modifications are set out in The OECD's Project on
Harmful Tax Practices: The 2001 Progress Report.295 First, the
modifications provided that the OECD would not apply any sanc-
tions to so-called uncooperative jurisdictions any sooner than the
April 2003 deadline imposed by the organization on its own mem-
bers to abolish their harmful tax regimes.296 Moreover, member
states would retain the right to determine whether or not to apply
any appropriate and/or proportionate sanctions on uncooperative
jurisdictions.297 Second, the modifications provided that the
OECD would in the future seek commitments regarding trans-
parency and effective exchange of information only, and would not
focus on the application of the no substantial activity criteria to
determine whether or not a tax haven was uncooperative.298
Third, because of ongoing discussions with the various jurisdic-
tions, and in keeping with the OECD's objective of obtaining as
many commitments to the initiative as possible, the OECD
extended the deadline for making commitments to cooperate with
the new guidelines to February 28, 2002.299 Finally, in an effort to
ensure that the committed jurisdictions had sufficient time to
develop and implement their plans, the OECD extended the time
for developing the compliance plan from six to twelve months after
291. See id.
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each jurisdiction made the commitment."°
In light of the OECD's modifications to its demands, CAR-
ICOM countries began to consider issuing commitments to the tax
initiative. Even before the Caribbean countries issued their rash
of commitments, the OECD announced that Barbados was no
longer included on the List of Tax Havens.30 1 Barbados' removal
from the list brought an end to a very public battle between the
OECD and one of its most vocal opponents.
Thereafter, as the new February 28, 2002 deadline
approached, the CARICOM nations issued the long-awaited com-
mitments to join the anti-harmful tax competition initiative. 2
Some jurisdictions, like Antigua and Barbuda, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, British Virgin Islands, Belize, the Bahamas, Gre-
nada, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos Islands, and the United
States Virgin Islands, wrote letters to OECD General Secretary,
Donald Johnston, pledging their commitment "to the principles of
effective exchange of information in tax matters and trans-
parency."0 3 These letters contained attachments outlining the
measures the respective jurisdictions would take to fully imple-
ment their commitments by December 31, 2005."°6 Other jurisdic-
tions - like Dominica and St. Lucia - issued press releases
announcing their commitment to the OECD principles of trans-
parency and effective exchange of information. 5 These press
releases also outlined just how those jurisdictions would fulfill
their commitments by December 31, 2005.306
Having received these commitments from all the CARICOM
member countries, when the OECD issued its List of Uncoopera-
tive Tax Havens on April 18, 2002, 30 no CARICOM country was
included on the list.
The removal of the fifteen CARICOM nations from the OECD
blacklist came at quite a price for the Caribbean island-nations.
300. Id. T 34.
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Not only did fourteen of those islands have to issue commitments
to the OECD, but they also had to enact legislation satisfactory to
the OECD member countries signaling their commitment to
arresting harmful tax competition and money laundering. Hence,
from the time the OECD launched its anti-harmful tax competi-
tion initiative in 1998, almost all CARICOM countries enacted
some form of related legislation. The list of CARICOM countries
enacting new legislation or amending already existing legislation
includes :308
1. Antigua and Barbuda - Enacted several amendments to the
Money Laundering (Prevention) Act of 1996, and the Interna-
tional Business Corporations Act of 1982.
2. The Bahamas - Enacted the Money Laundering (Proceeds of
Crime) (Amendment) Act 2000, the Evidence (Proceedings in
other Jurisdictions) Act 2000 and the Evidence (Proceedings in
other Jurisdictions) (Amendment) Act 2000. The Bahamas also
passed the following nine laws between October 2000 and Febru-
ary 2001:
(a) Central Bank of the Bahamas Act, 2000;
(b) Bank and Trust Companies Regulation Act, 2000;
(c) Financial Intelligence Unit Act, 2000;
(d) Financial and Corporate Service Providers Act, 2000;
(e) Criminal Justice (international cooperation) Act, 2000;
() International Business Companies Act, 2000;
(g) Dangerous Drug Act, 2000;
(h) Financial Transaction Reporting Act, 2000; and
(i) Proceeds of Crime Act, 2000.
3. Cayman Islands - Enacted Amendments to the Monetary
Authority Law, Proceeds of Criminal Conduct Law, Banks and
Trust Companies Law and Companies Management Law. The
Cayman Islands also issued new regulations and enacted new
laws that addressed customer identification and record keeping
for a wide range of activities.
4. Dominica - Enacted the Money Laundering (Prevention) Act,
2001, and the Exchange of Information Act, 2002.
5. Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis - Enacted the following four
laws:
(a) The Financial Intelligence Unit Act, No. 15 of 2000;
(b) The Proceeds of Crime Act, No. 16 of 2000;




(c) The Financial Services Commission Act, No. 17 of 2000;
and
(d) The Nevis Offshore Banking (Amendment) Ordinance, No.
3 of 2000.
6. St. Vincent and the Grenadines - Enacted the International
Banks (Amendment) Act, 2000 and the Confidential Relationships
(International Finance) (Amendment) Act, 2000.
VI. CONCLUSION
Four years after the OECD launched its anti-harmful tax
competition initiative, it was able to claim victory. Although the
organization did not achieve all that it had originally set out to
accomplish and had to tone down its rhetoric, it certainly achieved
much with regard to its relations with CARICOM. After all, the
OECD did receive commitments from fourteen of the fifteen CAR-
ICOM countries included on the original List of Tax Havens,
pledging that they would join the effort to fight so-called harmful
tax competition. The other CARICOM country included on the
original list, Barbados, was deemed by the organization to already
be in compliance, and therefore not deserving of being thus listed.
In essence, then, what the OECD received was total capitulation
by CARICOM.
But this capitulation does not mean that the leaders of the
CARICOM countries lack principle. Rather, the Caribbean
islands are, in the words of Lebrecht Hesse, "small and perceived
as weak, without the power to take on the might of the industrial-
ized countries which make up the OECD."30 9 Thus, although they
were understandably annoyed at the OECD and its bullying tac-
tics, they could hardly do much to stop the initiative. To survive
in this globalized economy, they really had no choice but to "fall in
line." Meanwhile, the OECD countries, like Blackbeard, Blue-
beard and the other pirates who plied the waters of the Caribbean
during the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries, can smile at
their success in once again robbing the Caribbean of its gold - its
sovereign right to determine its tax and economic policies, and the
rights of its people to shape their destiny.
309. Interview with Lebrecht Hesse, supra note 146.
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